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THE OCTOBER 1989 SUPREME COURT TERM AND
ANTITRUST: POWER, ACCESS, AND LEGITIMACY
STEPHEN CALKINS*
Never have so many Supreme Court antitrust cases effected so little
change, at least on the surface. The CCH Trade Regulation Reporter
included ten of this past term's final decisions. Yet antitrust law may not
be substantially different today from what it was a year ago.
In part the apparent lack of change is because four of the cases turned
on non-antitrust issues.' One hotly-disputed antitrust case failed to
* Professor, Wayne State University Law School.
Thanks to John Dolan for reviewing the manuscript, to Richard Steuer for supplying
me with briefs, to Bonita Reid for research assistance, and to the many lawyers who
discussed the impact of these cases with me. Work on this paper was supported by a Wayne
State University Career Development Chair.
Kansas & Missouri v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990); Texaco Inc. v.
Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447
(1990); Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2281
(1990); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990); California v.
American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno,
110 S. Ct. 1570 (1990); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990);
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990); Michigan
Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 110 S. Ct. 398 (1989) (per curiam; affirming
judgment by an equally divided Court).
2 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (1990) (O'Connor,
J.), held that "postjudgment interest runs from the date of the entry ofjudgment." Peel v.
Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990) (Stevens, J., 4-
member plurality opinion), was another entry in the all-too-long line of attorney advertising
cases. (The previous cases are summarized in Note, Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n:
Regulating Lawyers' Targeted Direct-Mail Advertising-A Constitutional Standard for an Ethical
Dilemma, 63 TUL. L. REV. 724 (1989).) This entry held that a state may not prohibit attorneys
from listing certifications as a specialist by bona fide organizations on their letterhead.
However, an essential concurrence emphasized that such claims, even if true, are potentially
misleading and thus may be regulated, e.g., by requiring disclaimers. Id. at 2293 (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment).
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2459 (1990) (O'Connor, J.), was the
Rule 11 case that taught that voluntary dismissals are not an easy exit for those making
baseless filings, that appellate courts should review Rule 11 decisions with a "unitary abuse
of discretion standard," and that one cannot receive Rule II attorney's fees for the cost of
defending a Rule 11 award on appeal. Rule I I's purpose, according to the Court, is "to
deter baseless filings in District Court." Id. at 2454. (Cooter & Gell was the Court's second
Rule 11 case. The first, Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456
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change the law precisely because it was so controversial, with an equal
number of Justices taking each side. The opinion in Hasbrouck,4 the
Robinson-Patman Act functional discount case, emphasized how little it
disturbed settled law. American Stores5 resolved a split in the circuits by
concluding that states and private parties may seek divestiture, but even
where this worked a change its practical consequences are limited. The
three remaining opinions are important principally for what they did not
do: Superior Court Trial Lawyers6 rejected an exception to the per se rule
against price fixing; Utilicorp declined to create an exception to Illinois
Brick;" Atlantic Richfield9 disagreed with a Ninth Circuit decision to relax
the rigor with which the antitrust injury requirement is applied.
Decisions not to change the law are rarely legal landmarks. Yet this
term's antitrust opinions have implications of possibly lasting significance,
significance not revealed by a simple recitation of what was decided. The
case with the most important implications is Trial Lawyers. It implicitly
expressed concern about the increased use of market power screens to
dispose of antitrust cases. By expressing this concern, Trial Lawyers may
contribute to the emergence of a third category of analysis, between
per se rules and the full-blown rule of reason. At the same time, its
(1989) (Scalia, J.), held that Rule 11 authorizes sanctions against attorneys who sign im-
proper court papers, but not against their law firms.)
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990), was a
typicalJustice Scalia opinion addressing the act of state doctrine. The Court was untroubled
by the Government's warning, as amicus, against adopting a 'rigid formula."' Id. at 706
(quoting Brief for United States at 37). "Act of state issues only arise when a court must
decide-that is, when the outcome of the case turns upon-the effect of official action by a
foreign sovereign." Id. at 705 (emphasis in original). The Court ruled that the validity of
a foreign sovereign's act was not put in issue by a complaint alleging that "commissions"
paid in connection with securing a Nigerian contract violated RICO and other U.S. laws.
The heart of the opinion is the conclusion:
Courts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to decide
cases and controversies properly presented to them. The act of state doctrine does
not establish an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign
governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of
foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.
Id. at 707.
Michigan Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 110 S. Ct. 398 (1989) (per
curiam, affirming judgment by an equally divided Court, Justice White not participating).
For a discussion of this case's thorny issues of interpretation of the statute permitting
newspaper joint operating arrangements, see Calkins, Developments in Antitrust and the First
Amendment: The Disaggregation of Noerr, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (1988).
' Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990).
5 California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990).
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990).
Kansas & Missouri v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990).
'Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
"Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
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reaffirmance of the per se rule is in tension with the more elaborate
attempts to integrate those two traditional forms of antitrust analysis,
and should help restore the confidence of lower courts in the use of per
se rules or their equivalent.
Of the three cases concerned principally with procedural issues, the
most intriguing is Atlantic Richfield. Although the case's holding con-
cerned antitrust injury, its language undermined whatever support re-
mains for the per se illegality of maximum vertical price fixing. The
noteworthy implications of American Stores and Utilicorp relate to state
and private antitrust enforcement. Although states brought both cases,
winning one and almost winning the other, private enforcement was the
greater beneficiary. The American Stores right to seek divestiture may
eventually be invoked more frequently by private parties than by states.
Furthermore, American Stores resoundingly reaffirmed the role of private
plaintiffs. The opinions almost consciously avoided praising state anti-
trust enforcement. Finally, although Hasbrouck created enough uncer-
tainty about functional discounts that its consequences will not be known
for years, it may have more lasting importance for its treatment of dam-
ages than for anything else.
The significance of the 1989-90 term, in short, will depend on how
the cases' implications are developed by lower courts and a Court without
Justice Brennan. This article opens by giving special attention to Trial
Lawyers, then discusses the three more procedural cases, and ends with
a review of Hasbrouck. My brief comments about the antitrust conse-
quences of Justice Brennan's retirement are included as Appendix A.
I. SUPERIOR COURT TRIAL LAWYERS*
In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association'° the FTC filed a
controversial challenge to a well-publicized "strike" by the relatively low
paid attorneys who regularly accept court appointments to represent
indigent criminal defendants." The FTC condemned the strike as a
boycott that was illegal per se and illegal under an abbreviated rule of
* This discussion of Trial Lawyers is a revised version of remarks delivered at Conference
Board and CATO Institute programs. The CATO Institute presentation is expected to be
published as part of the conference proceedings. Thanks for helpful comments go to J.
Baker, W. Blumenthal, W. Kovacic, E.T. Sullivan, and F.R. Warren-Boulton; responsibility
stays with the author.
'0 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990) (Stevens, J.), order enforced on remand, 897 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (without opinion).
"110 S. Ct. at 774 ("Reasonable lawyers may differ about the wisdom of this enforcement
proceeding. ... Respondents' boycott may well have served a cause that was worthwhile




reason. 2 The District of Columbia Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Doug-
las Ginsburg, vacated the Commission's order.'
3
The Circuit Court adopted a novel approach. First, it agreed with
the Commission in most respects: the boycott restrained trade without
procompetitive justification and could be condemned as per se illegal
unless protected by the first amendment. But then the court relied on
United States v. O'Brien,'4 the famous draft card-burning case, to rule that
the lawyers' boycott contained an "element of expression" deserving
first amendment protection. This ruling meant that any government
restriction could be "no greater than is essential" to further the govern-
ment's interest in protecting competition, which, the court wrote, pro-
tected the boycott absent proof that the lawyers had market power."
This conclusion was based on the court's view of per se rules: "The
antitrust laws permit, but do not require, the condemnation of price
fixing without proof of market power; even the per se rule, as the Com-
mission acknowledges in brief, is only a rule of 'administrative conve-
nience and efficiency,' not a statutory command."
6
The Supreme Court disagreed with unusual vehemence, pointing to
"two errors" in this analysis. First, far from being mere permissive pre-
sumptions, per se rules "have the same force and effect as any other
statutory commands." 7 Second, they reflect not only concern with conve-
nience but also "a long-standing judgment that the prohibited practices
by their nature have 'a substantial potential for impact on competition.' ""
Drawing particularly colorful analogies, the Court likened per se rules
to legislative prohibitions of speeding and of stunt flying in crowded
areas. These commands can be enforced even against drivers and pilots
"S 101 F.T.C. 510, 572-81 (1986) (Azcuenaga, Comm'r). The Commission ruled that the
boycott was "a naked restraint of trade for which no competitive justification exists" and
this was sufficient to condemn it under the rule of reason, although the Commission also
found anticompetitive effects. Id. at 577.
" 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988). For contemporaneous discussion of the opinion see
Calkins, supra note 3, at 372-75.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
' 856 F.2d at 249. The court also objected to the Commission's finding of market power,
107 F.T.C. at 575 n. 79 . That finding was based on the success of the boycott, whereas
success could have been based either on economic power or on publicity and political
persuasion. 856 F.2d at 250-52.
'( 856 F.2d at 249. The Commission's brief had agreed with the trial lawyers that "per se
and truncated rule of reason analysis serve the goals of 'administrative convenience and
efficiency,' " but had explained that this does not make these rules inappropriate methods
of analyzing restraints that constitute speech. Brief of Federal Trade Commission, Superior
Court Trial Lawyers (D.C. Cir.), at 39 (quoting the trial lawyers' brief) (emphasis added).
"110 S. Ct. at 780.
I8 ld. at 780 (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984)).
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so skilled as to pose little risk-and this would be unchanged were the
cars or planes to be festooned with streamers and banners and employed
as tools of communication.
Trial Lawyers' reaffirmation of the per se rule has important implica-
tions for Sherman Act jurisprudence. First and potentially most far-
reaching, Trial Lawyers implicitly sounded a note of concern about the
increasing use of market power screens. Second, there is tension between
the Court's language and the more ambitious efforts to integrate per se
analysis and the rule of reason. If nothing else, Trial Lawyers should
reassure lower courts that per se analysis or its equivalent is acceptable.
A. MARKET POWER SCREENS
In a series of articles, then-Professor Frank Easterbrook advocated
use of market power screens to dispose of unmeritorious cases.' 9 This
suggestion has been widely adopted in vertical restraint cases:' ° courts
conclude that the rule of reason applies, so market power must be proven;
proof of market power requires rigorous definition of a market, proof
of high market shares, and, sometimes, proof of entry barriers; plaintiff's
proof is deficient, so defendant wins summary judgment or dismissal.2'
Some courts have even used market power screens to evaluate horizontal
22
restraints. Trial Lawyers should at least slow, if not reverse, this trend.
Per se rules are needed, the Trial Lawyers Court wrote, to avoid " 'an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries.' ,23
Requiring proof of market power would introduce" 'the enormous com-
plexities of market definition into every price-fixing case.' ,,24 Although
the countervailing considerations may differ, this concern about injecting
merger-type proceedings into nonmerger antitrust law is equally applica-
ble to all market power screens.
19 E.g., Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 19-23 (1984).
2'0 The trend is nicely reviewed in Steuer, The Turning Points in Distribution Law, 35
ANTITRUST BULL. 467, 513-18 (1990).
2 E.g., DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499, 1507 &
n.10 (1 1th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1813 (1990).
22 E.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 296 (1985) (a boycott is per se unlawful only if "the cooperative possesses market
power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition"); Rothery Storage
& Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.); see Briggs &
Calkins, Antitrust 1986-87: Power and Access (Part 1), 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 275 (1987).
213 110 S. Ct. at 779 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
2'4 Id. (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 269 (1978)).
1991]
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Significantly, the Court did not rest its attack on market power screens
solely on considerations of judicial administration. Relying on a critic of
one of Judge Easterbrook's market screen articles, it wrote that "[f]or
reasons including market inertia and information failures, ... a small
conspirator may be able to impede competition. 25 The Court added,
quoting Judge Bork, that since firms unable to affect competition are
unlikely to conspire to fix prices, " 'the fact of agreement defines the
market.' ,,26
The potential implications of Trial Lawyers' discussion of market power
are far-reaching. One of antitrust's central issues is the chicken-and-egg
nature of market power: without market power apparent restraints are
unlikely to lessen competition, but firms are unlikely to enter into appar-
ent restraints lacking countervailing procompetitive virtues unless those
restraints are likely to lessen competition. 27 As a matter of theory it
doesn't matter which issue one is addressed first; as a matter of litigation
realities it makes all the difference in the world. The challenge in antitrust
is to identify those restraints that should be condemned without a merger-
type analysis, because as a practical matter they may not be condemned
otherwise.
Trial Lawyers reminds us of the costs imposed by market power screens.
The difficulty of proving market power is obvious from a review of the
many factors listed in the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines.28 The
point is emphasized by the cases in which defendants have relied on those
Guidelines to resist government attacks on mergers.29 Yet comparisons
to merger cases understate the challenge of proving market power in
15 110 S. Ct. at 781 (citing Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor
Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41,80 (1984), and noting that Markovits suggests "circumstances
in which a firm that lacks market power may nonetheless benefit from anti-competitive
tactics").
2 110 S. Ct. at 781 n. 18 (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 269 (1978)). None
of the briefs directed the Court's attention to this passage or to the article by Markovits.
It is only partly facetious to suggest that Trial Lawyers should remind plaintiffs to cite
Bork's book. Trial Lawyers and Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585 (1985), the past decade's two most aggressively pro-plaintiff Supreme Court
opinions, each relied heavily on Bork's reasoning. See Aspen, id. at 603, 604 n.31, 605,
608 n.39 (quoting ANTITRUST PARADOX). The successful Aspen respondent featured THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX in its brief. Brief for Respondent, at notes 43, 63, 79, and text at notes
26 & 78.
" See also Wall, Efficiency and Market Power: The "Chicken and the Egg" of Horizontal Restraint
Analysis, 4 ANTITRUST 34 (Summer 1990).
" Reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) $ 13,103. The challenge presented by a market
power requirement is so great that one plaintiff's attorney has advocated circumventing it
by recasting Section I cases as conspiracies to monopolize. Crew, Continuing Viability of
Pursuing "Traditional" Cases and New Litigation Theories, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 289 (1989).
' See infra note 105.
[Vol. 59
SUPREME COURT ANTITRUST 1989-90
Sherman Act litigation, and the burden on thejudiciary, because merger
litigation demands less rigorous proof of market power. Section 7 asks
only whether a merger "may" tend to lessen competition substantially,
which some courts read as a license to be less demanding; but there are
more important differences. A merger is unlikely to be challenged unless
there are relatively few substantial competitors, which eases burdens of
discovery and proof. In contrast, a Sherman Act case may involve scores
of firms combining for good reasons or bad. 30 The Merger Guidelines
worry only about whether market power may be increased, which is a
different and often easier question than whether it exists.? Moreover,
the realities of typical preliminary injunction battles (and the 24-hour
day) put a ceiling on the amount of time litigants and courts may invest.
Athough participants complain about the strain of merger litigation, far
more resources would be expended and far greater precision would be
expected were time unlimited. Unnecessarily requiring formal proof of
market power is made especially problematic because the courts use the
terms "market power" and "monopoly power" inconsistently. It is one
thing to condemn a restraint only when the parties can charge more than
marginal cost; it is quite another to require proof of Section 2-type
monopoly power before condemning a restraint. The concepts should
be treated differently but often are not.:2
The furor over the relationship between per se rules and the rule of
reason 3 3 camouflages the pivotal issue, which is whether to require formal
market definition and market share measurement. The Antitrust Divi-
sion requires apparently formal proof of market power before condemn-
ing an arrangement that is "plausibly related to some form of economic
integration" and is not "a naked agreement unrelated to any economic
integration of the parties' operations., 34 The FTC asks whether a ques-
30 Brief for the Federal Trade Commission, Superior Court Trial Lawyers, at 43 n.39.
J. Langenfeld & J. Morris, Analyzing Agreements Among Competitors: What Does
the Future Hold? (unpublished manuscript June 27, 1990) (also arguing that a trade
association can generate anticompetitive rents without an extremely large market share).
32 Briggs & Calkins, supra note 22, at 294-301.
Advocates of market power screens presumably would respond that it will often be
obvious that a firm or firms lack market power, however defined, and cannot influence
competition. There are such cases. My point is merely that requiring elaborate proof of
market power can put a high hurdle in the path of plaintiffs and impose heavy burdens
on the legal system, and that the problems caused by this hurdle and these burdens should
be recognized.
33 See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
3' The Division's most extensive discussion of its approach is found in its Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 13,109. The four-step rule of reason analysis therein described addresses
joint ventures but has more general applicability. In analyzing a joint venture and its
restraints, the Division, after determining that this is not a "naked agreement," first "deter-
1991]
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tioned restraint is "inherently suspect," and, if it is, evaluates any effi-
ciency justification, considering market power only where such justifica-
tion is plausible and valid.35 Superior Court Trial Lawyers can be read as
consistent with either approach.3"
It is more helpful, however, to consider Trial Lawyers as a companion
case to Indiana Federation of Dentists and Professional Engineers. TrialLawyers
was a per se case, Dentists a rule of reason case, ProfessionalEngineers a kind
ofjudicial chameleon, seemingly changing forms. 7 Yet each considered a
restraint's likely consequences and the proffered justifications, and then
condemned the restraint without formal market definition and market
share measurement. Trial Lawyers condemned a " 'classic restraint of
trade,' " saying it was no defense that prices were reasonable, that higher
prices might improve quality, or that the restraint had an "expressive
component" and the FTC had not proven market power.38 Professional
Engineers ruled that a total ban on competitive bidding restrained trade
on its face, and the proffered public safety defense confirmed the anti-
competitive effect and, implicitly, was implausible. Indiana Federation of
Dentists condemned a collective refusal by dentists to make X-rays freely
available to insurance companies, and found a "quality of care" defense
factually unpersuasive and of dubious legal relevance.
Indiana Federation of Dentists v. FTC can be understood best by con-
trasting it with the Seventh Circuit opinion that the Court reversed.39
The Seventh Circuit made three points. First, "the dentists are adhering
to a legal, moral, and ethical policy of quality and proper dental care,
mines whether the joint venture would likely create, enhance, or facilitate the exercise of
market power" in a defined relevant market, using the Merger Guidelines. Id. at 20,600.
Only in its fourth step does the Division consider whether procompetitive efficiencies
outweigh the risk of competitive harm.
" See Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988). The
Commission first asks whether a questioned restraint is "inherently suspect." If not, a full-
blown rule of reason analysis is required. If it is, the Commission asks whether it has
a "plausible efficiency justification." If not, the practice is condemned. If an efficiency
justification is plausible, the Commission determines whether that justification is really
valid. If not, the practice is condemned; otherwise, the restraint must be tested under the
traditional rule of reason. Id.
Supporters of the Division's approach would argue that Trial Lawyers condemned a
naked restraint; supporters of the FTC's would argue that it condemned an inherently
suspect restraint lacking a plausible efficiency justification. Since Trial Lawyers expressed
concern about too-frequently requiring proof of market power it might be seen as favoring
the FTC's approach, which many regard as likely to examine market power less often, but
the formulas permit such discretion in their application that one cannot be sure which
agency would examine market power first.
'4 National Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See infra note 74.
' 110 S. Ct. at 774, 778.
745 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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requiring that the insurers examine and review all diagnostic aids before
denying or approving a proper course of dental treatment., 40 This adher-
ence was "not manifestly anticompetitive."'" Second, whereas the rule of
reason requires proof of an anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant
market, the Commission had failed to engage in customary market defi-
nition but instead had "apparently assumed, without substantial eviden-
tiary support in the record, that because the.. dentists acted in concert
rather than individually, competition had to exist among and between
dentists in their policy of dealing with the insurers. 42 Third, there was no
substantial evidence that the agreement had increased prices or otherwise
harmed competition.4 3
The Supreme Court disagreed. The agreement was anticompetitive.
"A refusal to compete with respect to the package of services offered to
customers, no less than a refusal to compete with respect to the price
term of an agreement, impairs the ability of the market to advance social
welfare.... The Commission's failure to engage in "elaborate market
analysis" was unimportant for two independent reasons. First, the den-
tists' agreement was a " 'naked restriction on price or output,' " which
"'requires some competitivejustification even in the absence of a detailed
market analysis.' ,41 Second, there were "actual, sustained adverse effects
on competition," which can "obviate the need for an inquiry into market
power., 46 But the Court's discussion of competitive effects was not refer-
ring to customary measures such as increased prices or reduced output
(which measures, the Seventh Circuit had said, did not indicate harm to
competition). Rather, the only effect on competition was that insurers
were "actually unable to obtain compliance with their requests for submis-
sion of x rays. 47 In other words, it was sufficient to show that the dentists
had adhered to their agreement. The Court was untroubled by the lack
of evidence that prices had increased.48
40 745 F.2d at 1139.
4I ld.
4 2 Id. at 1141-42.
43 1d. at 1142.
14 476 U.S. at 459.
45Id. at 460 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984)).
46 Id. at 461 (quoting P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1511, at 429 (1986), where market
power was described as "but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects' ").
17 id. at 460.
" Id. at 461-62 ("A concerted and effective effort to withhold (or make more costly)
information desired by consumers for the purpose of determining whether a particular
purchase is cost justified is likely enough to disrupt the proper functioning of the price-
setting mechanism of the market that it may be condemned even absent proof that it
resulted in higher prices or, as here, the purchase of higher priced services, than would
occur in its absence.") (citation to Professional Engineers omitted).
1991]
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A third category of analysis, between the per se rule and the full-blown
rule of reason, is emerging. This category is unlike the classic per se rule
because defendants can prevail by showing a restraint was ineffectual4 9
and courts will at least consider some defenses. 5' But the category is
unlike the classic rule of reason because plaintiffs can prevail without
engaging in formal market definition and market share measurement,
at least unless defendants can show a procompetitivejustifiction for the
restraint.
51
Such a third category, whether called a "thoughtful per se rule," a
"quick look," a "truncated rule of reason," or something else, would be
a useful addition even if it is less elegant than the multi-factor approaches
endorsed by the Division and the FTC.5' If nothing else, explicit recogni-
tion of such a middle category could prevent mindless application of per
se rules and of the full-blown rule of reason.5 3
This absence of evidence about the restraint's effect on prices thus makes Dentists unlike
NCAA v. Board of Regents, a case with which it is frequently coupled. Both cases purported
to apply the rule of reason to what was described as a naked restraint, but then added that
lack of market power does not justify a naked restaint. But NCAA, unlike Dentists, went on
to find that the defendant had market power and that the restraint had raised prices and
reduced output. 468 U.S. 85, 104-13 (1984).
.q Cf. Trial Lauryers, 110 S. Ct. at 782 ("an assumption that, absent proof of market power,
the boycott disclosed by this record was totally harmless-when overwhelming testimony
demonstrated that it almost produced a crisis in the administration of criminal justice in
the District and when it achieved its economic goal-is flatly inconsistent with the clear
course of our antitrust jurisprudence"); Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460.
50 Areeda has explained that courts are getting better at identifying impermissible justifi-
cations. Areeda, A Second Century of the Rule of Reason, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 143, 149-50
(1990).
51 See Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459 ("Absent some countervailing procompetitive virtue-such
as, for example, the creation of efficiencies in the operation of a market or the provision
of goods and services-such an agreement limiting consumer choice by impeding the
'ordinary give and take of the market place' cannot be sustained under the Rule of Reason.")
(quoting Professional Engineers; citations omitted); NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
110 (1984) ("This naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive justifica-
tion even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.") (footnote omitted).
52 Supra notes 34-36. A middle category also would be blunter than the sliding scale I
have previously suggested, Briggs & Calkins, supra note 22, at 300-01:
Where conduct raises serious questions, a plaintiff should be able to satisfy any
burden of coming forward with evidence of market power by introducing any
of several kinds of evidence, including pricing, reasonable approximations of
structure, or conduct inconsistent with vigorous competition. The defendant
should then earn summary judgment or a directed verdict, on grounds of lack of
market power, only by discrediting this evidence. Where a defendant's conduct is
less egregious, a greater showing should be required of plaintiffs .... However,
given the ambiguity of evidence of entry conditions, plaintiffs should rarely be
required to prove that entry barriers are high.
(footnote omitted).
5' Two of the best "quick look" opinions were written by Judge Posner. In Vogel v.
American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit considered
[Vol, 59
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Even before Trial Lawyers some lower courts in rule of reason cases
had found that defendants' conduct could obviate the need to show
market power. For instance, in E.W. French & Sons, Inc., v. General Port-
land, Inc.,54 Judge Farris's concurring opinion reasoned that market
definition was unnecessary to find competitive harm when West Los
Angeles concrete sellers conspired on prices and worked together to
eliminate the only competitor not participating. 5 Conduct served even
more clearly as a surrogate for market power-or, in reality, to eliminate
the market power requirement-in Wilk v. American Medical Association.56
At issue in Wilk was the AMA's alleged boycott of chiropractors. The
court's rule of reason analysis invoked the now-standard Seventh Circuit
rule that the "threshold issue in any rule of reason case is market power""
and affirmed a perfunctory finding of same,58 but it also ruled that
an appraiser association's ethical rule barring fees set as a percentage of appraisals. The
Court's "quick look" revealed the existence of a sound justification for the rule (avoidance
of improper incentives or the appearance of fraud), that the rule probably would not
actually affect fees (but only the method of computing them), and that if the rule had any
effect on fees, it would tend to depress them (because percentage fees tend to inflate
appraisals and thus the dollar amount of fees). In General Leaseways, Inc. v. National
Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984), the Seventh Circuit took a "quick look"
and then condemned as per se illegal a territorial market division scheme allegedly justified
by the need for local member truck leasing firms to prevent free riding. Judge Posner
wrote that the defense was unpersuasive because only services were being provided and
members could charge separately for them (unlike for information, which poses more
serious free rider problems). Without the free rider defense, there was no justification for
the restraints.
5' 885 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1989) (Farris, J., concurring).
5' Id. at 1403 ("If a group of firms is able to fix prices, it is because their customers have
nowhere else to turn. Every price-fixing conspiracy thus identifies directly, in a real world
context, a group of firms which are insulated from outside competitive pressures."). It is
a little unclear why, if the facts showed a horizontal price conspiracy, the parties agreed to
apply the rule of reason.
In French a ready-mix concrete firm alleged that it was driven out of business by a
conspiracy between a competitor and a cement supplier that was part of a larger apparently
horizontal conspiracy. The jury had been instructed that a conspiracy to eliminate a single
competitor is lawful, and this was found to be reversible error. 885 F.2d at 1401. The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that a conspiracy to eliminate one competitor that also harmed competition
would be illegal. In his concurring opinion Judge Farris observed that implicit in the court's
decision was a conclusion that the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence of competitive
harm (because otherwise there would not be reversible error). His concurrence made the
implicit explicit.
56 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2621 (1990).
5' 895 F.2d at 359.
5' Having defined the market as "the provision of health care services to the American
public on a nationwide basis, particularly for the treatment of musculoskeletal problems,"
the district court's discussion consisted entirely of observations that (1) AMA members
"constitute a majority of medical physicians" and receive much the greater portion of the
fees paid to medical physicians, and (2) "[m]embers of the AMA constitute a substantial
force in the provision of health care services." 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1478 (N.D. Il. 1987).
The court of appeals repeated these findings and added that the plaintiffs' expert said the
AMA enjoys market power, that "AMA members received approximately 50% of all fees
1991]
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
this finding was unnecessary because there was "substantial evidence of
adverse effects on competition. '59 Following the lead of Indiana Federation
of Dentists, however, the court found these effects simply by evaluating
the AMA rules at issue: because those rules were obviously anticompeti-
tive, the usual market definition process was unnecessary.6"
In Trial Lawyers, the Supreme Court has now indicated its agreement
with suggestions that conduct can define a market or satisfy or obviate
any market power requirement. Since its observations were made while
condemning what it called per se illegal price fixing, it is unclear how
widely they apply. Nonetheless, the Court's concern about the costs associ-
ated with market power screens should have more general applicability
and may contribute to the emergence of a third category of analysis,
between per se rules and the full-blown rule of reason.
B. REAFFIRMATION OF THE PER SE RULE
Although it may contribute to the emergence of a category of analysis
between per se rules and the rule of reason, Trial Lawyers' effect on the
more ambitious attempts to combine those two methods of analysis is
more ambiguous. A trend toward the partial convergence of those meth-
ods of analysis has been discernible since the Court's 1979 decision in
Broadcast Music.6' The Court has said that "often no bright line" separates
the two approaches;6 2 rather, the "essential inquiry" is the same63 and
paid to health care providers," and that entry by new chiropractors was limited by barriers
such as educational requirements. 895 F.2d at 360.
M' 895 F.2d at 360.
' An AMA opinion declared it unethical to "associate professionally" with a chiropractor
by "making referrals of patients to chiropractors, accepting referrals from chiropractors,
providing diagnostic, laboratory, or radiology services for chiropractors, teaching chiro-
practors, or practicing together in any form." Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp.
1465, 1473 (N.D. Il. 1987), affd, 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2621 (1990).
The court's finding of anticompetitive effects was as follows: "'[I]t is anticompetitive to
prevent medical physicians from referring patients to a chiropractor;' it is anticompetitive
to prevent chiropractors from obtaining x-rays from radiologists and radiology depart-
ments; and " 'it is anticompetitive to prevent chiropractors from improving their education
in a professional setting by preventing medical physicians from teaching or lecturing to
chiropractors.' " 895 F.2d at 360 (quoting district court). The court appeared untroubled
by "the fact that the number of chiropractic schools, the number of chiropractors, and the
number of patient visits to chiropractors grew during the boycott." 671 F. Supp. at 1478.
6' Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
62 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984).
" Id. at 104 ("[W]hether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual
market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same-whether or not the challenged
restraint enhances competition.") (footnote omitted); see also National Soc'y of ProfI Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) ("In either event, the purpose of the analysis is
to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint .... ").
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"easy labels do not always supply ready answers., 64 Commentators and
lower courts have attempted to depict and contribute to a blending of
the two methods of analysis.65
As seen above, Trial Lawyers' holding can be read as consistent with the
leading integrated approaches blending per se rules and the rule of
reason, 66 even though it condemned the restraint as per se illegal. The
Supreme Court, the court of appeals, and the Commission all agreed
that the challenged conduct was "a 'naked restraint' on price and output"
and" 'a classic restraint of trade.' "' As Judge Ginsburg explained, even
those who would sharply limit the reach of the per se rule would include
this conduct within it; 68 most of those who would forswear the "per se"
label would condemn the conduct almost as quickly.
Nonetheless, the Court did rely unabashadly on the traditional per se
rule. The petitioners sought to play off the per se rules' decline in favor
by mocking the FTC's "repeated incantation of the term 'price fixing.' ,,
The Court was unimpressed, and, indeed, twice refuted criticisms of its
approach by saying that the trial lawyers had engaged in "price-fixing."7
Thus the opinion's atmospherics are largely of the old school."' Whether
6' Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979).
65 E.g., Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,653, at 22,333 (Feb. 22,
1989) (rules are "converging"); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS,
SECOND SUPPLEMENT 1983-1988, at 1-32-1-33 (1988); Halverson, The Future of Horizontal
Restraints Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 33 (1988); Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 859, 859 (1989) ("It is sometimes said there are two antitrust rules, per se and that of
reason. This view is incorrect; there is only one form of analysis, the rule of reason ...
The old and wrong view is that two forms of analysis exist.").
66 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
67 110 S. Ct. at 775 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984)); 856
F.2d at 234; 107 F.T.C. at 577.
68 856 F.2d at 236 (reviewing cases that have "decidedly shortened the reach of the per
se rule" but quotingJudge Bork's opinion in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033, for the proposition
that " 'a naked horizontal restraint, one that does not accompany a contract integration,
can have no purpose other than restricting output and raising prices, and so is illegal per
se' ").
6. Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association at 34
& n.24 (listing the 22 pages on which the FTC calls the boycott "price-fixing," and giving
an example of this "characterization-by-calling-it-so").
70 110 S. Ct. at 782 n. 19 ("we emphasize that this case involves not only a boycott but also
a horizontal price-fixing arrangement"); id. at 774 ("it is not our task to pass upon the social
utility or political wisdom of price-fixing arrangements"); see also 110 S. Ct. at 781-82
(quoting the famous footnote 59 in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940)).
7' The atmospherics are not unambiguous. The Court quoted Professional Engineers as
saying that the per se rule is one of 'two complementary categories of antitrust analysis,"'
but said that the rule of reason "generates" these categories. 110 S. Ct. at 780 (quoting
Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (both opinions byJ. Stevens). Also confusing
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the opinion's holding or its language will have greater influence remains
to be seen.
In any event, Trial Lawyers should reassure lower courts that per se
analysis or its equivalent can be applied at least to classic restraints of
trade. This is not the first time the Court has reminded lower courts of
its commitment to per se rules. Like a parent disciplining a wayward
child, the Court corrects lower courts that have forgotten the lesson, only
to see them stray again. Trial Lawyers is the third such correction in the
past decade,7" and the most vigorous.
Some courts had become hesitant to apply per se rules.73 Presumably
this hesitancy resulted from the Supreme Court's refusal to apply a per
se analysis to what the Second Circuit had called price fixing in Broadcast
Music and to what the Court itself called a " 'naked restriction on price
or output' " in NCAA and Indiana Federation of Dentists.4 In Dentists, the
was Trial Lawyers' closing. The Court wrote that one should not assume that the boycott
was harmless "when overwhelming testimony demonstrated that it almost produced a crisis
in the administration of criminal justice ... and when it achieved its economic goal." The
Court added that conspirators can be condemned even without "a degree of market power
any greater than that already disclosed by this record." 110 S. Ct. at 782. This could be
read as leaving open the question whether proof of less market power should be a defense.
". See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
13 Sims, Developments in Agreements Among Competitors, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 433, 436 (1989)
(per se rules had become "more like guidelines"); see, e.g., R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v.
Thermogenics, Inc., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,828 at 62,342 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(Noonan, C.J.) (two judges joined the opinion; two more concurred in the judgment; four
dissented) ("It has been broadly doubted whether the dichotomy between the rule of reason
and the per se rule still exists or is helpful to analysis.") (citation omitted).
" FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (quoting NCAA v. Board
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984)). In Dentists, the Court added that proof of actual
competitive harmjustified condemning the restraint even if it was not "sufficiently 'naked.' "
476 U.S. at 460. On the other hand, the per se rule against tying has come to resemble a
rule of reason, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (Stevens,
J.).
The confusion stems in part from Justice Stevens's opinion in National Soc'y of Prof'l
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The lower courts had condemned, as per se
illegal, an ethical rule prohibiting competitive bidding. 404 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1975),
affd in part and remanded in part, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Government defended
the result solely on the ground that the per se rule applied. Brief for the United States,
Professional Engineers. The Court affirmed. It held that the lower courts had properly
refused to consider the engineers' profferred justification that they were members of a
learned profession acting to prevent competition from endangering public safety. But the
Court said that "the asserted defense rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Rule
of Reason." 435 U.S. at 681. The Court added that professionals' "[e]thical norms may
serve to regulate and promote ... competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason."
Id. at 696. Yet it also said that "[oin its face, this agreement restrains trade within the
meaning of § I of the Sherman Act": "While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an
agreement." Id. at 692-93.
Ever since Professional Engineers was issued, observers have disagreed as to whether it is
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Court wrote that it had been "slow ... to extend perse analysis to restraints
imposed in the context of business relationships where the economict " ,,7 5
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious. Some courts
had cited this language to refuse to apply, not just extend, per se rules.
An example of apparently excessive reluctance to apply per se rules is
Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.v6 Relying on the Indiana
Federation of Dentists' language quote above, the Sixth Circuit wrote that
a jury should be instructed to judge even a classic movie split agreement
under the rule of reason. v7 The court then explained that movie theaters
"may be justified in combating the market power of film suppliers by
group action," and that a split agreement "may simply lower prices paid
by exhibitors to distributors." The court did not discuss whether parallel
analysis would justify price-fixing by small suppliers facing strong
buyers.78
An even more striking example is Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc.75 Other
than quoting the Indiana Federation of Dentists' observation,80 the Eleventh
Circuit did little more than summarize and endorse an unpublished trial
court opinion.8 ' But that opinion seems bafflingly wrong.
The facts suggest classic market allocation. Two bar review courses-
BRG serving only Georgia, the other (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) serv-
ing forty states under the name BAR/BRI-were engaged in bitter com-
petition in Georgia. While they were still competing, the two firms en-
a rule of reason or a per se case. Compare, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 357, 362 (Powell, J., dissenting) (per se) and Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales,
Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (per curiam) (same) with, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. at 458 (citing Professional Engineers for proposition that Court has been "slow to
condemn rules adopted by professional associations as unreasonable perse") and Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60, 65-66 (1982) (Burger, Ch.
J., dissenting) (Professional Engineers limits factors that may be considered under rule of
reason).
" 476 U.S. at 458-59 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979)).
76 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
7 Id. at 316 (quoting Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458-59 (1986)).
7' Balmoral Cinema gave an additional, more credible, reason for affirming a defense
verdict. The plaintiff, rather than being an injured film distributor, was a film exhibitor who
claimed that distributors had assisted other exhibitors' bid splitting by, among other things,
refusing to accept bids from the plaintiff. Courts should hesitate before condemning an
arrangement that, if illegal, would work to the defendant's disadvantage.
"' 874 F.2d 1417 (11 th Cir. 1989) (Hatchett, J.) (2- 1), amended, 893 F.2d 293 (11 th Cir.
1990), petitionfor cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3014 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1990) (No. 89-1667). [Editors
Note: The Supreme Court reversed Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 8-I, on Nov. 26, 1990.1
'0 874 F.2d at 1423.
"' Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., Civ. No. C85-4377 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1987), reprinted in
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, at Appendix C [hereinafter District Court Opinion].
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tered into negotiations leading to a 1980 agreement that reserved
Georgia for BRG and the other forty-nine states for HBJ. HBJ granted
BRG exclusive rights in Georgia to the BAR/BRI name and course materi-
als. HBJ claims, but cannot prove, that shortly before it entered into the
negotiations it had decided to withdraw from Georgia.82 In 1982, the
noncompetition clause was deleted to settle an antitrust suit and BRG's
rights in the BAR/BRI materials (but not the BAR/BRI name) became
nonexclusive, although HBJ has not returned to Georgia.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants because
the arrangement "does not fit within any recognized category of per se
liability., 83 It was not price-fixing because "neither agreement explicitly
addresses the factor of price" and BRG wasn't required to consult on
price. It was not "market or customer allocation" because it "was not a
situation where competitors divided up a market in which both have
previously done business, each taking a portion. 84
The court of appeals majority pronounced the lower court's opinion
"thorough and legally sound. 85 In response to a petition for rehearing,
which it denied, the court amended its opinion by adding the following:
We agree with the district court that the modified agreement (1982) is
not a market allocation agreement to which per se liability applies.
First, the agreement is not a "naked agreement" between competitors to
allocate the market. Second, HBJ and BRG are not horizontal competi-
tors. HBJ's affidavit states that it is no longer a competitor in the Georgia
market. The appellants have failed to produce evidence to the contrary.
In the absence of evidence other than the affidavit on this issue, we
cannot conclude that HBJ is doing business in Georgia.8"
The court's reasoning does not withstand analysis. The district court's
ruling that market allocation schemes are illegal only when they divide
markets in which the parties formerly competed is indefensible and,
indeed, appellees did not try to defend it. 87 Perhaps the court of appeals
12 District Court Opinion, supra note 81, at 139 ("no documentation of this decision has
been offered" and plaintiffs "question this testimony"). Moreover, in early 1980, the parties
apparently "discussed 'in passing' the possibility of BAR/BRI purchasing BRG," 874 F.2d
at 1429 n.5 (Clark, J., dissenting), which seems inconsistent with HBJ's having firmly
decided to abandon Georgia.
" District Court Opinion, supra note 81, at 148. The court also found that plaintiffs had
submitted insufficient evidence to sustain a rule of reason case.
8' Id. at 149 ("clearly the state of Georgia was not divided up under either the 1980 or
1982 agreements").
"' 874 F.2d at 1424.
s6 893 F.2d at 293.
7 Surely it would be unlawful, for instance, for two dominant firms to agree that one will
cease competing and they will share the profits. Conceivably the challenged arrangement
could be regarded as an efficiency-enhancingjoint venture. If that is what the court meant-
and this was not the basis on which the case was defended-it gave little explanation.
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meant that, as a matter of law, there was no agreement, i.e., that deletion
of the noncompetition clause eliminated the problem. This is a plausible
factual finding but it was not made by the district court, seems an unlikely
candidate for summary judgment, and deserves explanation. Nor is it
clear why HBJ and BRG are no longer competitors. An agreement not to
compete should not immunize subsequent adherence to that agreement.
Perhaps the court found that any reasonable jury would believe that
HBJ had decided to withdraw before it began negotiating the 1980
agreement. But an appellate court should not make such a finding with-
out discussion, especially since the district court's only relevant finding
was that HBJ withdrew from Georgia 'following the 1980 agreement." 8
More important, the court did not explain how an unannounced, unre-
corded decision by a competitor to exit a market converts that competitor
into a vertical supplier even before it leaves. Even after leaving, HBJ
remained a potential competitor, capable of reentering; before it left it
was an actual competitor.8 9
It is difficult to understand Palmer v. BRG. Perhaps this was simply
another case where attacks on the per se approach had made a court
unreasonably hesitant to apply it. 90 Trial Lawyers should remind such
courts that per se rules or their equivalent are acceptable.'
II. CALIFORNIA V. AMERICAN STORES CO.
Little needs to be said about American Stores 9 2 except to emphasize its
importance for private enforcement. The Court ruled that states and
private parties may seek divestiture, thus siding with the First Circuit"
8 District Court Opinion, supra note 81, at 149 (emphasis added).
88 When HBJ allegedly reached its decision to exit it was unaware that BRG, the competi-
tor from whom it was fleeing, had recently encountered a serious business setback. 874
F.2d at 1429 (Clark, J., dissenting).
' The plaintiffs in Palmer have requested certiorari. The United States has recommended
that the case be summarily reversed and remanded. The recommendation is sound. The
case is too wrong to be permitted to stand but too confused tojustify a full hearing. Another
simple solution would be to remand for reconsideration in light of Trial Lawyers. [Editor's
Note: The Supreme Court reversed, 8-1, on Nov. 26, 1990.1
9' For other evidence that the announcement of the death of the per se rule was prema-
ture, see Movie I & 2 v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 909 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir.
1990) (movie split agreements are per se illegal); United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897
F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1990) (customer allocation per se illegal); United States v. Cooperative
Theatres, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (illegal per se for two movie
theater booking agents to agree not to solicit each other's customers); Premier Elec. Cons.
Co. v. NECA, 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook,J.) (agreement between contractors
association and union to force nonunion contractors to contribute 1% to negotiating fund
was per se illegal).
9 California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990) (Stevens, J.).
93 CIA. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1985).
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rather than the Ninth.9 4 Commentators were generally in agreement.95
The real dispute concerns the case's significance.
Some have suggested that American Stores is an historic decision. Amici
told the Court that permitting states to seek divestiture would create
"intolerable uncertainty, 96 "would fatally undermine the very purpose"
of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,97 and even, "by threatening the efficacy
and stability of collective bargaining, undermine the policies of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act."9 " One distinguished observer, who agreed
that the decision creates a "big problem," declared this "the most impor-
tant antitrust ruling in a long time." 99
My assessment is more modest. States have never been and are unlikely
to become major players in the national merger scene. 00 Most state
attorneys general view their role, properly, as one that includes, if any-
thing, scrutinizing mergers with a particular local aspect or, at most, as
serving as a backstop to federal enforcement.' So long as federal en-
forcers appear to take their merger responsibilities seriously-and this
seems likely to continue-few states are likely to seek divestiture in liti-
gated merger actions.
Boosters of the importance of American Stores would respond that it
has changed merger strategizing. Before, this view holds, parties to a
" IT&T Corp. v. GTE Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975),followed, California v. Ameri-
can Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1989).
95 The Court relied on the Areeda-Turner treatise, 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 328b (1978), a recent student note, Divestiture as a Remedy in Private Actions Brought
Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 84 MicH. L. REV. 1579 (1986), and other law review
articles. 110 S. Ct. at 1866 n.28.
' ' Brief of the California Retailers Ass'n and the California Manufacturers Ass'n as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 4.
4' Brief of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union and its Affiliated Local
Unions 324 and 770 as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at 6.
" Id. at 15.
q' States Gain Power to Pursue Antitrust Cases, Wall St. J., May 1, 1990 [hereinafter States
Gain], at A3 (quoting Joe Sims) (article adding that case "substantially increases the risks to
companies involved in mergers"); see also Newman, High Court Upholds Challenges to Mergers,
N.Y.L.J., June 4, 1990, at 5 ("Much of the predictability in merger enforcement provided
by the Department of Justice and FTC Merger Guidelines is destroyed by the threat of
private actions that can be and often are brought without reference to those guidelines.")
(footnote omitted).
") See Report on State Merger Enforcement, by the State Merger Enforcement Task
Force of the Section 7 (Clayton Act) Committee, American Bar Association Antitrust Section
(1984), reprinted in 18J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. No. 2, at 361 (1988); Supplement
(1986), reprinted in 18 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. No. 2, at 413 (1988).
" Cf. Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special Commit-
tee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 42, 74 (1989)
("the states' primary mission should be those practices that harm consumers within a single
state").
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proposed merger might rebuff a state's inquiry; now parties fail to re-
spond at their peril, and often will give advance notice to affected states."'
This characterization exaggerates the change. Even when the Ninth Cir-
cuit's opinion was regarded as good law, counselors hesitated to rebuff
state enforcers. 0 3 Angering officials is risky. A state attorney general may
be able to challenge a merger prior to closing, especially when he or she
is assisted by a target firm or other interested party. Moreover, some
state antitrust laws apply or might apply to mergers and might authorize
divestiture. On the other hand, even after American Stores states cannot
credibly threaten many major consummated mergers. Historically there
have been few challenges, and resource constraints will likely prevent
this from changing. 04 If the Antitrust Division with its greater experience
and resources has difficulty winning merger cases, ° 5 states cannot expect
much success. To be sure, American Stores slightly strengthens the hand
of state investigators-but only slightly. A few merger practitioners seem
more likely to give states advance notice, but many still choose to ignore
the states except perhaps when working on the kind of locally-oriented
merger, often involving retailers, that has typically attracted the states'
attention. 106
Business may actually be a net beneficiary from this aspect of American
Stores. A different outcome could have inspired state attorneys general
to challenge major mergers under state law before state judges, which
would be unfortunate. American Stores will tend to keep merger enforce-
ment where it belongs, in federal courts applying federal law.
The American Stores right to seek divestiture will be enjoyed by private
parties as well as states, and in Sherman Act as well as Clayton Act suits.
10 7
0 Newman, supra note 99, text at note 35 (recommending consideration of use of the
National Association of Attorneys General Voluntary Pre-Merger Disclosure Compact);
States Gain, supra note 99, at A3 ("The ruling is likely to prompt firms to cooperate more
fully with state attorneys general than in the past.").
103 E.g., McDermott, Advising Your Client on Regional and National Mergers, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 239, 242-43 (1989).
"04 See supra note 100; Horn, The States' View of Regional and National Mergers, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 233,235 (1989) (observation by California's deputy attorney general that "as a practical
matter, states will have limited ability and limited resources to go after and attack national
or very large regional mergers").
105 E.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States
v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Country Lake Foods,
Inc., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,113 (D. Minn. June 1, 1990); see Calkins, Developments
in Merger Litigation: The Government Doesn't Always Win, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 855 (1987).
106 See supra note 100; see also Constantine, The States' Role in Challenging National Mergers
is Vital, 3 ANTITRUST 37, 38 (Spring 1989) (states have focused "mainly on retailing").
107 International Travel Arrangers v. NWA, Inc., 1990-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,112 (D.




In fact, it may be invoked more frequently in complaints filed by private
parties. For instance, plaintiffs in a price-fixing suit may be able to argue,
with an economist's support, that a key factor facilitating the alleged
cartel's success was a merger's elimination of a competitor. A request
for divestiture might not be frivolous and presumably would make a
monetary settlement more attractive.
Moreover, American Stores includes a hymn to private enforcement.
Few plaintiffs' lawyers could improve on the Court's language: "Private
enforcement of the Act was in no sense an afterthought; it was an integral
part of the congressional plan for protecting competition."''0 American
Stores is as much a private case as a state case, but neither aspect of it
works fundamental change.
III. KANSAS & MISSOURI V. UTILICORP UNITED, INC.
American Stores, along with the previous term's ARC America decision,0 9
might have suggested that the Supreme Court is enthusiastic about state
antitrust enforcement. Any such illusions were shattered by Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion in Kansas & Missouri v. Utilicorp. "0
Utilicorp focused principally on the possible "cost-plus" exception to
Hanover Shoe's"' rule that direct purchasers may seek damages based on
illegal overcharges, whether or not those overcharges were passed on,
and to Illinois Brick's"2 corollary rule preventing indirect purchasers from
seeking damages for those overcharges. The petitioner states argued for
a new exception based on their status as parens patriae plaintiffs' and,
more generally, relied on that status to address Illinois Brick's concern
about deterrence." 4 The Court rebuffed both arguments. It dismissed
summarily the argument for a parens patriae exception to Illinois Brick,
0 1 10 S. Ct. at 1860 (citation omitted). The Court wrote that the Clayton Act's provisions
"manifest a clear intent to encourage vigorous private litigation against anticompetitive
mergers." The "statutory scheme ... favors private enforcement, subjects mergers to
searching scrutiny, and regards divestiture as the remedy best suited to redress the ills of
an anticompetitive merger." Id. at 1860-61.
,,9 California v. ARC America Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989).
"0 Kansas & Missouri v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990).
.. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
112 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
113 Section 4c of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15c, authorizes state attorneys general to seek monetary relief on behalf of natural persons
residing in their states injured by antitrust violations.
"' See infra note 116.
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adding that it had "rejected this argument before.""' 5 With respect to
deterrence, the petitioners argued that parens patriae authority was
designed precisely to remedy concerns that consumers will not sue.l
6
The Court was unimpressed: "Although state attorneys general have
greater expertise, they may hesitate to exercise the parens patriae device
in cases involving smaller, more speculative harm to consumers."'  The
Court thus suggested that attorneys general may hesitate to use parens
patriae in the kind of case for which it was intended. The Court supported
its observation with an apparent reference to a discussion of the "head-
line-grabbing" tendencies of state attorneys general. "8 Conspicuous by
its absence was any discussion of the importance of state antitrust enforce-
ment. Indeed, American Stores' endorsement of private enforcement
makes the silence all the louder. Recent Supreme Court cases thus do
not appear to be harbingers of an era of solicitude for state antitrust
enforcement.
The principal issue in Utilicorp, however, was a generic Illinois Brick
issue, involving a variation of the possible "cost-plus" exception recog-
15 110 S. Ct. at 2818. The Court ruled that the parens patriae authority was merely a
procedural device permitting states to enforce existing rights, and here there were (the
Court found) none. The States first raised this argument in their Supreme Court brief on
the merits. See Brief for the Petitioners, at 23-27; see also Brief of the National Conference
of State Legislatures, International City Management Association, Council of State Govern-
ments, National Association of Counties, National Governors' Association, National League
of Cities, and U.S. Conference of Mayors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (devel-
oping the argument at length). Respondent Utilicorp sharply attacked the states' "belated
reliance on Section 4c." Brief for Respondent Utilicorp United, Inc., text at notes 15-19.
'16 Brief for the Petitioners, at 20 ("The Court also suggested in Illinois Brick that the
potentially small stake of indirect purchasers may impede antitrust enforcement if they are
granted standing to sue. But the parens patriae mechanism of 15 U.S.C. § 15c is designed
to remedy that exact concern.") (citation omitted)); see also Brief of Forty-Six States as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, text at notes 7-10 ("State attorneys general have the
incentive and the experienced, specialized antitrust counsel to prosecute these suits vigor-
ously on behalf of their citizens.").
"1 110 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
110 S. Ct. at 2816, citing Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to
Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Cm. L.
REV. 602, 613 (1979). Utilicorp had quoted the following discussion from that page:
"Given the political character of parens patriae enforcement, it is doubtful that it
can be relied upon as an adequate antitrust deterrent. There may well be a
tendency under parens patriae for state attorneys general to bring headline-grab-
bing, scapegoat-seeking suits against politically unpopular corporations, with little
regard for the intrinsic antitrust merit of the suit and with little effort to press the
suit to a successful conclusion. By the time the case is ready for trial, the state
attorney general's office may be occupied by a new politician with little interest in
carrying out the projects of his predecessor."
Brief for Respondent Utilicorp United Inc., text at note 12.
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nized in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. "9 In their petition for certiorari,
the Utilicorp petitioners presented the case as offering a choice between
the Tenth Circuit's decision below, which had ruled that only fixed quan-
tity, cost-plus contracts qualified for exemption, and the opinion Judge
Posner had crafted for the Seventh Circuit in Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v.
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.120 Panhandle, a case facially similar to
Utilicorp, had created a new, deceptively narrow exception to Illinois
Brick.12' Unfortunately for petitioners, their facts differed materially
from those of Panhandle:
* Panhandle was a fairly simple case with one utility, one state, and one
kind of contract; Utilicorp was a mess, with two states, scores of utilities,
and numerous sets of regulations;
0 In Panhandle regulation-mandated contracts formally required the
utility pass on all fuel price increases, 22 whereas in Utilicorp regulations
may or may not have required complete passing on (the parties disagreed,
but the better argument seemed to be that at least some fuel was not
subject to such a requirement); 123
* In Panhandle the court found that the utility enjoyed "unexhausted
monopoly power": regulation had kept rates below market levels, so the
1'9 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481,494 (1968) ("We
recognize that there might be situations-for instance, when an overcharged buyer has a
pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been dam-
aged-where the considerations requiring that the passing-on defense not be permitted
... would not be present."); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977):
In such a situation [i.e., where there is "a pre-existing cost-plus contract"] the
purchaser is insulated from any decrease in its sales as a result of attempting to
pass on the overcharge, because its customer is committed to buying a fixed
quantity regardless of price. The effect of the overcharge is essentially determined
in advance, without reference to the interaction of supply and demand that
complicates the determination in the general case.
See also California v. ARC America Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989) (the Court in IllinoisBrick
"implicitly recognized" that its concern was "that at least some party have sufficient incentive
to bring suit" by "noting that indirect purchasers might be allowed to bring suit in cases in
which it would be easy to prove the extent to which the overcharge was passed on to them").
12 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986; see Petition for Writ. of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, at 7 ("[Tlhe issue
presented is purely a question of law on undisputed facts: where there exists a mandatory,
readily-proven pass-through of overcharges, which holding is correct-that of the court
below in this case, or that of the Seventh Circuit in Panhandle Eastern?").
' Although the holding was narrow, the court said its analysis would treat requirements
contracts the same as fixed-quantity contracts, 852 F.2d at 898, which could have broadened
the cost-plus exception.
12 852 F.2d at 894; see also 839 F.2d at 1213 (Posner, J., dissenting from panel opinion).
i21 866 F.2d at 1292 & n.2 (a division of Utilicorp "did not resell natural gas by way of
a purchased-gas adjustment clause mechanism); Brief for Respondent Utilicorp United,
Inc., text at note 9 (same); cf 110 S. Ct. at 2814 (parties disagree on whether all sales were
subject to requirements to pass through all overcharges).
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utility (unlike competitive firms and firms subject to looser regulation)
could and did pass on all price increases without sacrificing profits; the
lower courts in Utilicorp had not discussed the issue;
9 In Panhandle the court found that industrial purchasers had alterna-
tive sources of power and thus the utility did not enjoy unused monopoly
power over them, so the utility could recover overcharges on purchases
for resale to industry; in Utilicorp there were no such findings, so there
was risk that claims based on sales to industry would be lost were the
court to create an Illinois Brick exception.
In Panhandle the court found that the utility's "unexhausted monopoly
power" over consumers was a substitute for a fixed quantity clause, so
Illinois Brick did not apply. The Utilicorp petitioners had to phrase the
issue more broadly. Unfortunately for them, however, the Justices never
agreed on what the issue was-and their disagreement emphasized the
risks of complicating litigation. The majority interpreted the "cost-plus"
exception as limited to where a direct purchaser suffers no injury at all,
such as (they said) where the quantity is fixed. 12 4 For them the question
was whether to create a new exception for resales by regulated public
utilities that may or may not have been required to pass on all price
increases 12 and that may or may not have done So.126 Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, they thought not, pointing in part to the parties' factual disputes. 127
The four dissenting Justices said the question was whether Illinois Brick
should prevent indirect purchasers from recovering based on a complete
and easily provable pass-on.18 Also unsurprisingly, perhaps, they
thought not; but theirs was the minority view.
124 110 S. Ct. at 2817-18; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent (same).
125 110 S. Ct. at 2814 (noting disagreement between petitioners and respondent over
extent of sales subject to automatic rate increases).
126 The Court observed that the question certified to the Tenth Circuit by the district
court, and then answered by the Tenth Circuit, asked whether there should be an exception
when "most or all of the price increase" was passed on. In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust
Cases, 695 F. Supp. 119, 1120 (D. Kan. 1988) (on motion for certification) (emphasis
added); 852 F.2d at 1294 (answering certified question in negative); 110 S. Ct. at 2814
("The certified question ... leaves unclear whether the respondent had passed on 'most or
all' of its costs .... "); see also Brief for Respondent Utilicorp United, Inc., at Question
Presented (the certified question should be the question asked).
27 110 S. Ct. at 2814 ("The difficulties posed by issues of this sort led us to adopt the
direct purchaser rule, and we must decline to create an exception that would require
their litigation."). The Court said the petitioners had "oversimplified the apportionment
problem" since it was not clear whether and when price increases would have been passed
on, and whether part of any such pass-on price increase might be artificial, because prices
would have been increased anyway.
128 110 S. Ct. at 2818 (White, J., dissenting, in an opinion joined by justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun). This was the question identified by petitioners, who asked
whether there was an exception "where there is an easily-proved, 100% pass-on of illegal
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Given the language and concerns apparently motivating the Hanover
Shoe-Illinois Brick decisions, any attempt to expand an exception faced an
uphill battle. 129 Illinois Brick's principal concern had been about complex-
ity,' 30 and exceptions complicate things; Illinois Brick specifically cau-
tioned against exceptions for particular markets.' 3' Exceptions tend to
permit additional litigants and additional issues. Uncertainty poses spe-
cial problems in antitrust, moreover, because the stakes can be so high.
Given that Panhandle could not be relied upon, plaintiffs' only realistic
hope was to make a strong showing that vigorous antitrust enforcement
required an exception. The Court's discussion of what it called this "criti-
cal part of the case" 131 was unsatisfactory,133 but the states did not succeed
in convincing a majority of Justices of the importance of suits by these
indirect purchasers. Ironically, Professor Hovenkampjust published an
article-too late to be considered by the Court-questioning some of the
assumptions underlying Illinois Brick. ' 4 We are unlikely to learn whether
overcharges, effected by federal and state regulation." Brief for the Petitioners, at i. It also
is the issue addressed by the trial court, which had ruled that discovery on the amount of
any pass-on was unnecessary because even a " 'perfect pass-on' " pursuant to a rate regula-
tory system would not justify an exception. In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases,
695 F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (D. Kan. 1988) (emphasis added); see also 866 F.2d at 1293 (no
exception "even if we assume, as we do for the purpose of deciding the issues before us,
that there was a perfect and provable pass-on of the allegedly illegal overcharge").
2 9 But cf. 110 S. Ct. at 2818 (White, J., dissenting, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun). justice White wrote the Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick opinions, and the ARC
America opinion that discussed those cases. Justice White's Utilicorp dissent was joined by
the three Illinois Brick dissenters. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 748 (Brennan, J., dissenting,
with Justices Marshall and Blackmun.); Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting).
") Calkins, Illinois Brick and its Legislative Aftermath, 47 ANrTIrRUST L.J. 967 (1978); see
Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 732 n. 12 (citing Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive
Use of the Passing-On Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 98, 108 (1972)).
3' 431 U.S. at 744.
12 110 S. Ct. at 2816 ("If we were convinced that indirect suits would secure this goal
better in cases involving utilities, the argument to interpret § 4 to create the exception
sought by the petitioners might be stronger.").
1'3 Petitioners alleged that utilities lack incentive to file antitrust suits because regulation
would require the passing on to consumers of any gains. (Indeed, the Court pointed to this
passing on of gains as reason why it was unnecessary to permit consumers to sue on their
own. 110 S. Ct. at 2814-15.) The Court argued essentially that utilities will file antitrust
suits either at the prodding of regulators or because they probably could retain some of
the recovery. 110 S. Ct. 2816. In making this argument, the Court showed rare confidence
in the effectiveness of regulation. Moreover, taking comfort from the retention of part of
the recovery seems at odds with Illinois Brick's concern with "concentrating the full recovery"
in one party, 431 U.S. at 735; see also ARC America, 109 S. Ct. at 1667 ("Illinois Brick was
concerned that requiring direct and indirect purchasers to apportion the recovery ...
would result in no one plaintiff having a sufficient incentive to sue .... ").
"", Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1717
(1990). Hovenkamp argued that given the breadth of the statutory language and the
economic reality that the direct purchaser usually will be relatively uninjured, only very
clear deterrence needs should prevent recoveries by indirect purchasers. He questioned
the frequency with which such a showing can be made. For instance, he suggested that
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his views would have influenced the Court's thinking, however, because
the Court's Utilicorp majority survives and, given that majority's hostility
to Illinois Brick exceptions, it seems doubtful that the Court will be ad-
dressing the issue again soon.135
IV. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. V. USA PETROLEUM CO.
Unfortunately, at least for scholars, Justice Brennan's last antitrust
opinion, Atlantic Richfield, 136 assumed away the interesting issue. The case
was filed by gasoline discounters objecting that they were the targets of
an ARCO maximum resale price maintenance campaign. The district
court granted summaryjudgment for want of antitrust injury. That court
said that antitrust injury could not be shown unless the challenged prices
were " 'predatory,' " and it reasoned that predatory pricing could not be
shown given the absence of price-cost data and "because, given petition-
er's market share and the ease of entry into the market, petitioner was
in no position to exercise market power.,,137
On appeal, the plaintiff USA Petroleum did not challenge the trial
court's finding that ARCO's prices had not been predatory. Instead, it
argued and a Ninth Circuit majority agreed that it could prevail even if
the prices were not predatory. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the per
se prohibition of price-fixing, including vertical maximum price-fixing,
was intended to prevent interference with market forces, and USA Petro-
leum was injured by such an interference (and, indeed, ARCO intended
to injure it), so USA Petroleum satisfied any antitrust injury re-
quirement. 
3 8
The Supreme Court applied the antitrust injury requirement more
rigorously: "injury, although causally related to an antitrust violation,
deterrence may be enhanced more by the numerousness of potential plaintiffs than by the
size of their incentives.
135 After Utilicorp, even a cost-plus, fixed-quantity contract may not qualify for exemption.
The Court reiterated that this was merely a possible exception. 110 S. Ct. at 2818. Moreover,
although the Court quoted language from Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick explaining that
absence of injury to direct purchasers justifies such an exception, it is not clear that even
these contracts can prevent any injury at all. Panhandle Eastern, 852 F.2d at 898 ("the seller
under a fixed-quantity cost-plus contract might forbear to insist on a 100 percent pass
through in order to curry favor with the buyer for the sake of future deals").
1.6 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
"' 110 S. Ct. at 1888 (summarizing (unpublished) opinion and quoting Appendix to
Petition for Certiorari 3b); cf. 859 F.2d at 702 n.7 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (ARCO never
had more than 17% of the market).
"' 859 F.2d at 693-95. The Ninth Circuit also rejected Atlantic Richfield's claim that
USA Petroleum had been injured only by an increase in competition. Any harm caused by
illegal pricing is anticompetitive harm, reasoned the court, and, in any event, "when firms
conspire to fix low prices in order to drive out competition, the long-term consequences
may be higher prices and reduced service to consumers." Id. at 696.
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nevertheless will not qualify as 'antitrust injury' unless it is attributable
to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny" 139 -here,
vertical, maximum price-fixing, not simply price-fixing in general. The
Court then gave Albrecht 4 ' more attention than it had received in a long
time. Albrecht is the now generally discredited opinion that permitted a
newspaper distributor to use the antitrust laws to vindicate its right to
charge more than the publisher-suggested price. Justice Brennan's care-
ful exegesis of Albrecht explained that the competitive harm addressed
therein was to distributors, whose pricing freedom was impaired, and to
consumers, who could suffer when capped prices meant distributors
could not afford to offer desired premium services, but Albrecht's ratio-
nale did not assume that competitors were harmed. 4 ' Accordingly, the
Court ruled that dealers and consumers may suffer antitrust injury but
competitors may not.
The Court's approach is strikingly different from that of the Seventh
Circuit in Jack Walters, with which the Ninth Circuit had disagreed. 4
That approach would conclude that dealers probably would not suffer
antitrust injury from vertical maximum price-fixing. 143 Perhaps needless
to say, the Seventh Circuit did not parse Albrecht as carefully as Justice
Brennan did.
USA Petroleum argued that even if its injuries were not those motiva-
ting Albrecht, they were the intended consequence of Atlantic Richfield's
pricing agreements and should qualify as antitrust injury. The Court
disagreed. Antitrust injury flows only from "an anticompetitive aspect of
the defendant's conduct," and low prices cannot harm competition if
they are not predatory. "' The Court explained this by noting that non-
predatory pricing cannot exclude rivals in the long run "unless they are
relatively inefficient." 45 Since it was stipulated that the prices at issue
were nonpredatory, the Court did not have to define that term.1
46
' 110 S. Ct. at 1889 (relying on Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104
(1986)).
'
1 1 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
110 S. Ct. at 1890. Indeed, Albrecht appeared to assume that competitors would benefit
from the tendency of vertical maximum price-fixing to prevent the offering of preferred
combinations of price and service. Id.
112 859 F.2d at 697.
" Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 709 (7th Cir.) (Posner,
J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984) (no antitrust injury when dealer faced nonpredatory
low prices caused by manufacturer's vertical maximum price-fixing).
"'I 110 S. Ct. at 1892.
1,.15 110 S. Ct. at 1891 n.7 (adding that "[e]ven if that were false, however, a firm cannot
claim antitrust injury from nonpredatory price competition on the asserted ground that it
is 'ruinous' ").
l6 110 S. Ct. at 1893 n.10 ("We have no occasion in the instant case to consider the
proper definition of predatory pricing, nor to determine whether our dictum in Matsushita
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With this line of reasoning the Court assumed away the difficult issue,
namely, the identification of predatory prices. Although the case's proce-
dural posture permitted the Court to decide it without defining "preda-
tory," doing so made a challenging question seem easy. Professor Areeda,
the leading advocate of cost-based predatory pricing rules, 147 does not
claim that prices above marginal cost/average variable cost can never
harm competition or exclude an equally efficient firm. 48 His argument,
instead, is that the game of identifying predatory prices above that level is
not worth the candle-that a bright line is needed to encourage aggressive
pricing, and the bright line of marginal cost/average variable cost strikes
the proper balance, sacrificing some legitimate claims in order not to
deter desired pricing. This is a trade-off analysis, a pragmatic search for
a workable rule.
The trade-off may or may not be the same for vertical maximum
price-fixing as for a monopolist's aggressive pricing, but the Court never
recognized the issue. It observed that "a vertical price-fixing scheme
may facilitate predatory pricing,"'149 which suggests that the trade-off is
different, but it did not explore the ramifications of this observation.
Perhaps the Court meant "predatory pricing" to include only pricing that
could not harm competition under any circumstances. If so, however,
the Court should have made clear that it was contemplating a stricter
test, since this is quite different from the usual Areeda-Turner-inspired
standards.
As a practical matter, these issues may never be resolved. Few plaintiffs
will venture to challenge vertical maximum price-fixing because the
charge inspires little sympathy from judges or juries, requiring proof of
predation makes an already unappealing task even less attractive, and
Ailantic Richfield undermined whatever precedential support remained
for labeling vertical maximum price-fixing per se illegal.
This last point is made most clearly by considering part of plaintiff's
oral argument. It protested the suggested requirement of proof of below-
cost pricing. This was inappropriate, it said, because such a requirement
that predatory pricing might consist of 'pricing below the level necessary to sell [the
offender's] products,' is an accurate statement of the law.") (citation and cross-reference
omitted).
"' The seminal article is Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). The Court relied on it and
subsequent writings by Areeda in Atlantic Richfield, 110 S. Ct. at 1892 & n.8, 1894 & n.13;
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 n.12, 119 n.15 (1986); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.9, 589, 591 (1986).
1' P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 714.1b (Supp. 1989).
"9 110 S. Ct. at 1892 n.9. The Court explained that vertical price-fixing can force down-
stream dealers to share predation's losses, although it is not clear why those dealers would
agree to do so.
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presumed that some vertical price-fixing is beneficial. 50 The Supreme
Court essentially responded that the plaintiff was right, and some vertical
price-fixing is procompetitive. 15 ' The Court wrote at length about the
potential benefits of vertical maximum price-fixing, especially now that
most nonprice vertical restraints are lawful."'5
The Court said it assumed "arguendo" that Albrecht continues to be
good law. 153 Yet as a practical matter Justice Brennan, who had joined
the Albrecht opinion, drove the last nail into its coffin. Thus, although
Atlantic Richfield is considered a procedural case, its substantive implica-
tions may be just as significant.
V. FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS: HASBROUCK
Functional discounts have been antitrust's emperor without clothes. A
functional discount occurs, in the typical example, when a wholesaler
pays a lower price than a retailer.154 Antitrust counsellors have long
believed that functional discounts are legal or almost always legal, and
numerous secondary sources support this view. 55 Less clear, however,
150 Injury From Non-Predatoy RPM Agreement is Subject of Supreme Court Oral Argument, 57
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 790, 791 (Dec. 7, 1989).
'51 110 S. Ct. at 1894 n. 13 ("Vertical, maximum price-fixing thus may have procompetitive
interbrand effects even if it is per se illegal because of its potential effects on dealers and
consumers.") (citing Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Albrecht).
152 110 S. Ct at 1894 & n. 13 (citing numerous authorities). Among the authorities cited
by the Court was a recent article that urged the Court to rethink Albrecht but that also
generally agreed with the Ninth Circuit's outcome in Atlantic Richfield, Blair & Harrison,
Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1989). That article enjoyed the unusual
honor of being cited favorably twice by the majority and twice by the dissent. 110 S. Ct. at
1891, 1894 n.13; 110 S. Ct. at 1898 n.9, 1903 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 110 S. Ct. at 1889 n.5 ("We assume arguendo that Albrecht correctly held that vertical
maximum price-fixing is subject to the per se rule.").
15 The Hasbrouck Court accepted, as "adequate for [its] discussion," the definition sug-
gested by the United States and FTC as amici: " 'A functional discount is one given to a
purchaser based on its role in the supplier's distributive system, reflecting, at least in a
generalized sense, the services performed by the purchaser for the supplier.' " 110 S. Ct.
at 2542 n. II (quoting Brief for United States and Federal Trade Commission as Amici
Curiae, at 10).
15' The point was made most crisply in an amicus brief filed by former Assistant Attorney
General Edwin Zimmerman: "For decades antitrust lawyers have advised their clients that
selling to wholesalers at a discount does not violate the Robinson-Patman Act .. " Motion
for Leave to File and Brief of the American Petroleum Institute and the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition, at 16; see also, e.g., ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 250 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter ANTI-
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS] ("Where lower prices reflecting functional discounts are
charged to wholesalers, they have generally been upheld .. "); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
MONOGRAPH No. 4, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW VOLUME I, at 54 (1984)
("In general, so long as wholesalers and retailers do not compete directly in the resale of
goods, the Act permits a manufacturer to grant a functional discount to a wholesaler for
distribution services."); E. KINTNER & J. BAUER, 3 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 318 (1983)
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has been the rationale for functional discounts' favored status. Some
justify it in terms of competitive effect,15 6 some in terms of lack ofdiscrimi-
nation, 5 ' some in terms of availability, 58 some in terms of cost justifica-
tion,' 59 some for want of causation, 60 and some because any other conclu-
sion would be unthinkable.' 6' We were not sure why functional discounts
were legal or almost always legal, but we were sure they were.
Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck16 2 did not change any of this. Functional dis-
counts continue to be legal or almost always legal and we are still not
sure why. What has changed is that someone-notably Justice Scalia,
concurring-is observing that in the unusual world of the Robinson-
Patman Act no one has yet justified these discounts' privileged status.'6 3
("Functional discounts ... are usually deemed lawful.") (footnote omitted); F. ROWE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 174 (1962) ("In practice, the competi-
tive effects requirement permits a supplier to quote different prices between different
distributor classes...."); H. SHNIDERMAN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN PERSPECTIVE 37 (1977)
("Ordinarily, the granting of a lower price to a customer class operating at a higher level
of distribution will not injure customers who buy directly from the manufacturer but at a
somewhat higher price because they operate farther down the distribution channel.");
Calvani, Functional Discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV.
543, 549 (1976) ("Since the respective purchasers are on different levels of the chain of
distribution, and thus do not compete with each other, it is argued-and generally held-
that in this situation there is no competitive injury.") (footnote omitted); Scher, How Sellers
Can Live with the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 Bus. LAW. 533, 548 (1986) ("functional discounts
can certainly be granted lawfully").
156 H. Shniderman, supra note 155, at 37 ("no injury is likely"); Calvani, supra note 155,
at 549. Nor are the commentators clear about why there is no competitive effect. E.g., Rill,
Availability and Functional Discounts Justifying Discriminatory Pricing, 53 ANTrIrRusT L.J. 929,
934 (1984) ("Either because of this additional cost [to the wholesaler] or because competing
buyers do not function at the same level, a functional discount is considered lawful since
the likelihood of competitive injury is remote.") (footnote omitted).
157 Celnicker & Seaman, Functional Discounts, Trade Discounts, Economic Price Discrimination
and the Robinson-Patman Act, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 813, 816 (distinguishing functional dis-
counts from "trade discounts").
58 Celnicker & Seaman, supra note 157, at 836-42 (distinguishing between functional
discounts and "trade discounts"); Rill, supra note 156, at 934 n.29 ("availability principle
may also apply").
159 E. KINTNER &J. BAUER, supra note 155, at 309-10 (also discussing competitive effect).
160 F. ROWE, supra note 155, at 203 (independent pricing decisions of wholesalers "sever
any causal link" between the price discrimination and any harm).
'6' E. KINTNER &J. BAUER, supra note 155, at 318-20 (making manufacturer liability turn
on wholesaler's prices would encourage violation of Sherman Act Section 1); F. Rowe, supra
note 155, at 204 (incompatibility with antitrust laws).
162 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990) (Stevens, J.).
16' Refusing to join in the customary lamentations about the failings of RP's drafters,
Justice Scalia (with Justice Kennedy) wrote that the Act's language
is straightforward: any price discrimination whose effect "may be substantially...
to injure, destroy, or prevent competition" is prohibited, unless it is immunized
by the "cost justification" defense .... There is no exception for "reasonable"
functional discounts that do not meet this requirement. Indeed, I am at a loss to
understand what makes a functional discount "reasonable" unless it meets this
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Although Justice Scalia may be correct if one ungrudgingly interprets
that statute, a majority disagreed.
Even though functional discounts are always or almost always legal,
Texaco lost. A group of direct-buying retail gasoline stations recovered
damages for injuries caused by Texaco's charging them higher prices
than it charged to two firms that functioned in part as wholesalers. The
retailers won because the Court was not prepared to rule that as a matter
of law every functional discount is legal.
Texaco made three arguments. Fist, it argued that a functional dis-
count is not discriminatory.'64 Texaco boldly relied on the same legislative
history that had failed to persuade the Court when, in FTC v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc.,165 it ruled that price discrimination "is merely a price differ-
ence." The Court rejected this first Texaco argument largely by repro-
ducing passages from its Anheuser-Busch opinion.
66
Second, Texaco argued that Hasbrouck was harmed only by the inde-
pendent pricing decisions of favored wholesalers, for whom Texaco
should not be responsible. 167 This argument foundered on the language
of the Act, which "specifically encompasses not only the adverse effect of
price discrimination on persons who either grant or knowingly receive
the benefit of such discrimination, but also on 'customers of either of
them.' ,,168
Texaco's third and principal argument reasoned, in effect, that func-
tional discounts must be legal because, as everyone knows, they must be
legal. 69 The Court generally agreed: "most functional discounts will be
requirement.
110 S. Ct. at 2555 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White also wrote less
colorfully that nothing in the Act especially protects functional discounts. 110 S. Ct. at 2553
(White, J., concurring in the result).
Justice Scalia argued that the only "plausible" argument supporting special treatment
for functional discounts is availability, i.e., if any retailer could have purchased from a
favored wholesaler, no retailer could have been harmed by that favoritism. Since the parties
did not raise this argument, Justice Scalia (and the Court, 110 S. Ct. at 2551 n.30) did not
decide it.
"" Reply Brief of Petitioner Texaco Inc., at 12; Brief of Petitioner Texaco Inc., at 21-
22.
165 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960) (Warren, Ch. J.).
Texaco correctly noted that Anheuser-Busch, unlike Hasbrouck, involved a primary line
claim, but the Court correctly responded that none of Anheuser-Busch's reasoning was
limited to primary line claims.
Reply Brief of Petitioner Texaco Inc., at 13; Brief of Petitioner Texaco Inc., at 23.
110 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting statute).
E.g., Brief of Petitioner Texaco Inc., at 16:
Anyone in the business of selling to retailers must be able to buy for less than he
or she sells. In short, wholesalers must get a lower price than retailers. If they
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legitimate discounts," and "legitimate discounts" are lawful.17 0 But the
Court, observing that commentators "tend to agree that in exceptional
cases what is nominally a functional discount may be an unjustifiable
price discrimination, '1' ruled that not every functional discount is legiti-
mate. It followed that Texaco's were not legitimate, a finding that is
unsurprising given that Texaco had sought to prevail as a matter of law
and had not introduced evidence of legitimacy (and what evidence there
was suggested the discounts could not be justified).
The legal standard, then, declares that "legitimate" functional dis-
counts are legal; "gratuitous" ones 172 are not. This standard raises four
questions: (1) Which functional discounts are legitimate? (2) Why are
they legal? (3) Who bears the burden of proof? (4) Who determines
legitimacy?
(1) Which functional discounts are legitimate? Whereas both the Gov-
ernment as amicus and the Court said that only legitimate functional
discounts are lawful, they disagreed on the meaning of legitimacy. With-
out seeming to attach much importance to it, the Government wrote that
a functional discount is legitimate whenever it is "given to a firm that
performs some services for the supplier ... not performed by firms fur-
ther down the chain of distribution."'' 7 3 The Court defined "legitimate"
more strictly to include an element of proportionality. It offered two
different tests, one couched in terms of cost to the buyer; '71 one in terms
cannot, there will be no wholesalers. In addition, the margin between the buying
price and selling price must be sufficiently large to satisfy the wholesaler that it is
in the right business-that the potential exists not only to recover expenses but also
to earn a satisfactory profit, making the risks, investment and effort worthwhile.
(emphasis in original).
70 110 S. Ct. at 2550. The Court quoted at length from the REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMiTrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 208 (1955) [hereinafter
AG's COMMITTEE'S REPORT], a secondary source quoted by the Government as amicus but
not cited by either party. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 21. In language quoted by the Court, the
Committee wrote that " '[pirice cutting at the resale level is not in fact, and should not
be held in law, 'the effect of' a differential that merely accords due recognition and
reimbursement for actual marketing functions.' " 110 S. Ct. at 2545. The Court declared
that the differential described by the Committee "is not illegal." Id. at 2546. It is interesting
to note that Justice Stevens was a member of that Committee.
"' 110 S. Ct. at 2549; see, e.g., authorities cited supra note 155.
172 Id. at 2546.
.. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, at 15 n. Il (emphasis added). Justice White lamented that the
Government failed to "spell out the types of functional discounts that the Commission
considers defensible." 110 S. Ct. at 2552 (White, J., concurring).




of value to the supplier.71 5 Cost to the buyer and value to the seller can
be quite different, yet the Court did not choose between the tests. The
opinion should be read as permitting functional discounts justified on
either basis, 176 but whether it will be read this way may not be settled for
years.
(2) Why are legitimate functional discounts legal? Principally because
"a legitimate functional discount will not cause any substantial lessening
of competition.' 77 The Court ruled that the Morton Salt75 inference,
which presumes secondary line competitive injury when competitors
have been charged substantially different prices over time, 179 should
not apply to legitimate functional discounts. 80 Even more reassuring to
potential defendants, the Court went further and declared that legitimate
functional discounts do not lessen competition and are thus lawful.s
Justice Scalia protested in vain that although functional discounts might
not lessen competition in RP terms if functional discounts merely reim-
burse wholesalers for their costs (because indirect customers are unlikely
to receive lower prices), the Court appeared to contemplate more gener-
ous functional discounts as nonetheless legitimate (i.e., discounts based
on value to sellers) and the Court never explained why these more
generous discounts could not lessen competition in RP terms.'8 2 The
Scalia position has merit if one reads RP ungrudgingly, but it attracted
only two votes.
'7 Id. at 2546 ("reasonable reimbursement for the value to Texaco of their actual market-
ing functions").
76 This follows from the Court's general solicitude for functional discounts and from its
discussion of the AG's CoMMirrEE's REPORT, supra note 170. That report argued for the
legality of "a price differential 'that merely accords due recognition and reimbursement
for actual marketing functions.'" 110 S. Ct. at 2546 (quoting Report). The Court declared
that such a discount "is not illegal." Id. It went on to say that the Report "would not
countenance a functional discount completely untethered to either the supplier's savings or
the wholesaler's costs," id. (emphasis added), thus implying that the Report (and the Court)
would uphold a functional discount justified by one of the two standards. The Court made
especially clear that functional discounts need not be justified solely by a wholesaler's costs,
by agreeing with the Government that had the Ninth Circuit required this it would have
erred. 110 S. Ct. at 2547 n.22.
"' 110 S. Ct. at 2545 n. 18. The Court also wrote that it "generally agree[d]" with quoted
language from the AG's COMMI FFEE'S REPORT, supra note 170, at 208, which reasoned
that sellers offering legitimate functional discounts should not be responsible for the
consequences of independent pricing decisions by their customers. 110 S. Ct. at 2545.
7' FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1948).
" 7 Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 435 (1983) (under
Morton Salt, "injury to competition is established prima facie by proof of substantial price
discrimination between competing purchasers over time").
0 !10 S. Ct. at 2544-45, 2550.
Id. at 2545, 2550.
112 See also id. at 2552-53 (White,J., concurring) (the Court fails to explain why legitimate
functional discounts cannot injure competition in the RP sense).
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(3) On whom is the burden of proof? Hasbrouck explained the legality
of legitimate functional discounts as a matter of causation, which places
the burden of proof on the plaintiff.18 3 In contrast, sellers bear the burden
of proof for the "costjustification" and "meeting competition" defenses-
and, as a practical matter, face an uphill battle.8 4 The Court said that
sellers "need not satisfy the rigorous requirements of the costjustification
defense in order to prove that a particular functional discount is reason-
able" and thus legal.8 5 The Court differentiated its approach from cost
justification in part because that defense has met with mixed success, at
best, whereas "one would expect that most functional discounts will be
legitimate [and lawful] discounts."' 8"
(4) Who decides whether functional discounts are legitimate? Texaco
lost in Hasbrouck because the Court ruled that the legitimacy of its func-
tional discounts was an issue, and not something conclusively to be pre-
sumed. The Court did not have to, and did not, say whether legitimacy
is a question of law or of fact. However, the indicia of legitimacy, such as
value to sellers and costs to buyers, are fact intensive, and presumably
"reasonableness" is as well. Except in clear cases juries decide fact-inten-
sive issues. Yet if juries decide legitimacy, sympathetic plaintiffs may win
a significant number of cases-which should not happen, presumably,
because according to the Court most functional discounts are lawful.
Although this conundrum may be resolved eventually by solicitude for
appropriate summary judgment motions, until then the fact-specific na-
ture of the legitimacy determination will make life challenging for RP
counsellors.
The Court also made RP counseling more challenging by devoting
considerable attention to two special weaknesses in Texaco's case, features
that will make the case distinguishable at least on its facts from many
future cases. First, the two wholesalers favored by Texaco resold most of
their volume directly to consumers, i.e., as retailers. The Court observed
that such "scrambled functions" have "frequently signaled the illegiti-
183 The Court said it was in "substantial agreement" with James Rill's explanation that
"'the burden of proof remains with the enforcement agency or plaintiff in circumstances
involving functional discounts since functional pricing negates the probability of competi-
tive injury, an element of a prima facie case of violation." 110 S. Ct. at 2545-46 n.18
(quoting Rill, supra note 156, at 935).
184 E.g., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 155, at 238-47.
1a1 110 S. Ct. at 2545; see also id. at 2547 n.21 ("a causation defense in a functional discount
case does not demand the rigorous accounting associated with a costjustification defense.").
Justice Scalia protested, "How is one to determine that a functional discount is 'reasonable'
except by proving (through the normally, alas, 'rigorous' means) that it meets this [cost
justification] test? Shall we use a nationwide average?" 110 S. Ct. at 2555 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
a' 110 S. Ct. at 2550.
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macy under the Act of what is alleged to be a permissible functional
discount.'. 7 Second, Texaco actively encouraged its favored wholesalers
to sell directly to consumers and recognized that the resulting retail
price disparities were causing plaintiffs' market shares to plummet. "The
special facts of this case thus make it peculiarly difficult for Texaco to
claim that it is being held liable for the independent pricing decisions of
[its wholesalers]." 88 These special facts were not central to the Court's
reasoning, so their absence will not immunize a functional discount.
Nonetheless, their presence in a pricing program should alert counsellors
to a need for special scrutiny, and their absence is fair grounds for
distinguishing Hasbrouck.
Hasbrouck speaks to more than just functional discounts. As noted
above, it reaffirmed Anheuser Busch's rule that price discrimination is
merely a price difference-a rule with wide-spread RP applicability." 9
Moreover, Hasbrouck is also important because the Court declined to
extend Truett Payne.'90
In Truett Payne the Court rejected the notion that proof of an RP
violation entitles treble damages plaintiffs to a presumption of injury in
the amount of the discrimination. Rather, such plaintiffs "must make
some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust laws
were designed to prevent."' 9 ' This and subsequent lower court opinions
have made clear that a plaintiff may not base its damages claim on an
assumption that it would have enjoyed a seller's lower prices.' 92 Truett
Payne has been a boon to the RP defense bar, which has used it to win
quick victories'9 3 and, presumably, to discourage suits.
The Hasbrouck plaintiffs rather neatly solved their Truett Payne prob-
lems. 94 Hasbrouck's expert calculated damages using three different
assumptions about how Texaco could have eliminated the discrimination:
by lowering prices to plaintiffs, by raising prices to wholesalers, and by
"'7 Id. at 2550.
"
8 Id.
.ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 155, at 222-23.
"'j. Truett Payne Co..v. Chrysler Motors Co., 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
'9' 451 U.S. at 562. The Court said its decision was "virtually governed by our reasoning
in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)."
192 E.g., Rose Confections, Inc. v. Ambrosia Chocolate Co., 816 F.2d 381, 394-95 (8th
Cir. 1987); Olympia Co. v. Celotex Corp., 771 F.2d 888, 892 (5th Cir. 1985).
193 Calkins, SummaryJudgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tenden-
cies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1134-35, 1139 (1986).
" Their concern about the case was acute, since it had been the basis of an earlier Ninth
Circuit defeat, Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 828 (1982).
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doing some of each. 195 According to the Court, in awarding damages the
jury apparently credited the expert, "who had estimated what [plaintiffs']
profits would have been if they had paid the same prices" as the favored
buyers. 96
Texaco protested that the "practical effect" of this three-alternatives
gambit was to "vitiate Truett Payne.",9 7 In a brief argument not wholly
without appeal, Texaco claimed that the lower courts had let automatic
damages in through the back door, permitting a plaintiff to invite the
jury to do what the plaintiff itself could not. 9 Of all Texaco's claims,
this was the one that most worried the plaintiffs.
t 99
200In an odd damages discussion, the Court failed to address the issue.
Whether one reads Texaco's version of the damages question pre-
sented20' or Hasbrouck's,2 0 2 there is little connection to the Court's discus-
sion. The possibly relevant part of that discussion was as follows:
19' Brief of Respondents, Statement of the Case Section F; Brief of Petitioner Texaco
Inc., at 10; see also Hasbrouck, 634 F. Supp. at 43 (in four of six hypothetical scenarios
plaintiffs offered to the jury, the discrimination was eliminated partially or entirely by
lowering prices to plaintiffs). Plaintiffs justified their use of the three alternatives by
explaining that Texaco had considered each of them.
'96 110 S. Ct. at 2541.
197 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, at 16.
'9' Id. at 15-16 ("Respondents assume they can get more than they are legally entitled to
if they offer 3 or 6 scenarios and combine the permissible with the impermissible. Respect-
fully, that cannot be the law.") (footnote omitted); Brief of Petitioner Texaco Inc., at 31.
The best argument to the contrary was presented by the Government, when it reasoned that
nothing in Truett Payne "precludes the jury from concluding that the price discrimination in
this case might have been eliminated by reducing the price that respondents paid." Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, at 8 n.6.
'99 Interview with Robert H. Whaley (Aug. 7, 1990). The plaintiffs must have been
particularly troubled by the tension with Rose Confections, Inc. v. Ambrosia Chocolate Co.,
816 F.2d 381, 394-95 (8th Cir. 1987), which found reversible error when the plaintiff's
expert offered the jury two damages theories, one of which assumed automatic damages.
200 In addition to the matters mentioned in the text, the Court said it did "not understand
Texaco to be challenging the sufficiency of respondents' proof of damages." 110 S. Ct. at
2543. The Court wrote this in the face of separate "questions presented" devoted to
damages, infra notes 201 and 202, and its opinion's separate section devoted to damages.
21 ' Brief of Petitioner Texaco Inc., at i:
3.... [Wlhere the allegedly favored customer is a wholesaler, the allegedly disfa-
vored customer a retailer, and the purported illegal price discrimination is a
discount given to all wholesalers, may the retailer predicate injury and recover
treble damages on the basis of how much better off he would have been had he
too received the wholesaler discount, in whole or part?
212 Brief of Respondents, at Questions Presented for Review:
3. In awarding damages for a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, may the jury
consider evidence of what prices the favored and disfavored buyer would have
been charged in the absence of the violation, or must thejury assume that, absent
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Even if some portion of some of respondents' injuries may be attribut-
able to the conduct of independent retailers, the expert testimony neverthe-
less provided a sufficient basis for an acceptable estimate of the amount of
damages. We have held that a plaintiff may not recover damages merely
by showing a violation of the Act; rather, the plaintiff must also "make
some showing of actual injury attributable to something the antitrust
laws were designed to prevent." At the same time, however, we reaf-
firmed our "traditional rule excusing antitrust plaintiffs from an unduly
rigorous standard of proving antitrust injury." Moreover, as we have
noted, Texaco did not object to the instructions to the jury on the
damages issue. A possible flaw in the jury's calculation of the amount of
damages would not be an appropriate basis forAranting Texaco's motion
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.2
Although the highlighted language approves of the expert's testimony,
the context was very different from that addressed by the parties. The
Court minimized the importance of its decision, moreover, by noting that
Texaco did not object to the jury instructions-although this is a bit of a
red herring because the trial court's error, if any, was in admitting evi-
dence, not in instructing thejury2 0° Since the Court apparently regarded
the damages issue as not properly before it and since the Court did not
address the parties' arguments, the case should not be said to hold that
plaintiffs' approach to damages was proper.
Even though it would read too much into the opinion, some lower
courts may cite Hasbrouck as endorsing the three-alternatives approach . 5
The Ninth Circuit's opinion does endorse this approach, moreover, and
that opinion has nationwide prominence because the Supreme Court
passed up an opportunity to reverse or disagree with it. Given the impor-
tance of RP injury and damages and the paucity of functional discount
cases, Hasbrouck's damages discussion, odd as it is, may be at least as
important as its treatment of functional discounts.2 6
the discrimination, the supplier would have charged the favored buyer a higher
price?
211 110 S. Ct. at 2552-53 (quotingJ. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Co., 451 U.S.
557 (1981)) (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).
201 Cf. 842 F.2d at 1043-44 (admission of damage projections not reversible error in part
becausejury was instructed not to award automatic damages). The relevant language (from
Instruction No. 28 was as follows: "[Y]ou may not determine a plaintiff's damages, if any,
merely by determining the price difference between favored and disfavored buyers and
multiplying that figure by the number of gallons involved, since ... the measure of damage
is that proximately caused by the price discrimination."
On the other hand, the plaintiffs claimed that Texaco also failed to object to its damages
testimony and exhibits. Brief of Respondents, text at note 46. Texaco's briefs neither
concede this or deny it.
"5 See J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524 (3d Cir. 1990).
201 What Hasbrouck's damages discussion did not do was important in another respect as
well. Texaco argued briefly that the thriving competition in the relevant market precluded
any finding of competitive injury. Brief of Petitioner Texaco Inc., at 29. A similar analysis
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VI. CONCLUSION
In a 1987 article a co-author and I discussed recent antitrust develop-
ments in terms of "power and access," focusing particularly on market
power-the importance of which was increasing-and on access to the
antitrust system.20 ' These two issues were also central to the past term's
Supreme Court antitrust cases: the Court slowed the trend toward market
power emphasis and refused to ease access to the antitrust system. The
cases are important less for changing the law than for their implications
for the future. The most important implications are found in Trial Law-
yers, which reaffirmed the use of per se rules and implicitly expressed
reservations about the use of market power screens.
can be found in Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988), a case not
cited by Texaco. The Supreme Court chose not to mention the issue. It thus left intact
the Ninth Circuit's declaration that "injury to competitors may be probative of harm to
competition," 842 F.2d at 1040. The Third Circuit recently relied on this language to hold
that at least in secondary line cases injury to a competitor can satisfy RP's requirement of
competitive injury, J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524 (3d Cir. 1990).
This is a change from earlier Third Circuit teaching, Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v.
Texaco, 637 F.2d 105, 122 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981) (directed verdict
proper because no evidence of "a substantially adverse effect on competition, rather than
merely an adverse effect on it, a competitor"), followed in Kem-Tech, Inc. v. Mobil Corp.,
1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,947, at 61,869 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Finally, Hasbrouck's damages discussion is significant because it perpetuates Truett Payne's
blurring of the lines between the fact of damage and the amount. Truett Payne referred to
the Court's "traditional rule excusing antitrust plaintiffs from an unduly rigorous standard
of proving antitrust injury." 451 U.S. at 565.Justice Powell, withJustices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, concurred in part but explained correctly that "the plaintiff has the burden
of proving the fact of antitrust injury by a preponderance of the evidence" and only then
may a court be lenient concerning proof of the amount of damages. 451 U.S. at 569-70
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); accord Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J.
Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 908 (1982). Yet
Hasbrouck quoted the Truett Payne language endorsing a relaxed standard of proving injury.
See alsoJ.F. Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1539 (quoting this part of Hasbrouck and apparently relying
on it).





A BRIEF COMMENT ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF JUSTICE
BRENNAN'S RETIREMENT
What will be the consequences for antitrust of Justice Brennan's retire-
ment and his replacement presumably by Judge Souter? Unfortunately,
we know little about Judge Souter's views on antitrust. We do know
Justice Brennan, although I can only touch on an antitrust legacy that
deserves a lengthy article. Regardless of his reputation on social issues,
Justice Brennan was no wild-eyed antitrust liberal. Consider the following
cases, in each of which a majority of Supreme Court Justices including
Justice Brennan voted for the defendant: Atlantic Richfield,' Business Elec-
tronics,' Cargill,3 Northwest Wholesale Stationers,4 Southern Motor Carriers,
5
Jefferson Parish,6 Associated General Contractors,7 Broadcast Music,8 A&PI
Borden.9 jJustice Brennan went along with many of the past decade's most
important Supreme Court defense victories.'°
Nonetheless, a couple of outcomes would have changed had you re-
placed Brennan with Richard Posner, to choose a known alternative. The
two cases that are most interesting are Maricopa County," where a four-
three majority including Brennan applied the per se rule to condemn a
physicians' cost-containment program, and Jefferson Parish, 12 where five
Justices including Brennan reiterated the per se rule against tying (al-
though finding it inapplicable), whereas fourJustices preferred to switch
to the rule of reason. Presumably Posner would have voted differently
and the Chicago School would have fared better.
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990) (Brennan, J.).
Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (Brennan, J.).
Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985) (Brennan, J.).
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985) (Powell, J.).
"Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (Stevens, J.).
' Associated General Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519 (1983) (Stevens, J.).
"Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. I (1979) (White, J.).
'Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69 (1979).
.. In addition, Justice Brennan joined the opinion in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (Powell,J.), which, although upholding a verdict for the plaintiff,
has principally benefited defendants.
" Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (Stevens, J.).
1 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (Stevens, J.).
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But Souter isn't Posner. Lawyers are not born into the Chicago School.
Confidence is required to favor economics over precedent, and Souter
has not enjoyed Posner's many years of immersion in economics. Thus,
significant change is only possible, not probable.
Justice Brennan also played an important role in the summary judg-
ment trilogy, Celotex, 13 Matsushita, 14 and Liberty Lobby. ' 5 Brennan dissented
from each and wrote two strong opinions. Since he was out-voted one
cannot say that substituting another jurist would have changed an out-
come. Nonetheless, many antitrust issues arise in the summary judgment
context, and the presence of someone as personable and persuasive as
Brennan urging restraint in dismissing cases can make a difference.
Defendants may be slightly pleased that this powerful voice for the plain-
tiff on summary judgment issues is no longer on the Supreme Court.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
15 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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